June 2nd 2006

The emperor's new brain: a modest proposal for the removal of perennial obstacles in the investigation of brain/mind causality

By Michael A. Corner, Netherlands Institute for Brain Research, Amsterdam
(email: m.Corner@nin.Knaw.Nl or e.Juten@hccnet.Nl)

Abstract. In an effort to eliminate conceptual barriers to research on the most intransigent aspects of the 'mind/brain problem', the traditional a priori arguments against neurobiological determinism are held up for scrutiny and found to be wanting. Five major fallacies (semantic, atomistic, perceptual, psychological and sociological, in that order) are highlighted, all of which stand revealed as little more than rationalizations for cultural bias or wishful thinking. Subsequently, in view of its being the central stumbling block to understanding not only volition but also consciousness in general, the subjective experience of 'self' is explored from both an empirical and an introspective point of view. It is emphasized that self-consciousness is a highly flexible phenomenon, and a first approximation to its putative morpho-physiological basis in the brain is proposed.

"I never cease to be amazed at how uncritical even the most learned brains can be regarding certain propositions, in particular those that have been imparted to them on the authority of famous names rather than by the logic of their own causal thinking"
Frederick II (Holy Roman Emperor) Palermo, 1250 A.D.

"In conclusions which can only be known by reasoning, I say that the testimony of many has little more value than that of few, since the number of people who reason well in complicated matters is much smaller than that of those who reason badly". Galileo Galilei (Physics Professor) Florence, 1620 A.D.

"It's not enough to dislike an idea, it must also be shown to be wrong!"
Norbert Wiener (Mathematics Professor) Cambridge, 1960 A.D.

"The absurdity of many of our most cherished assumptions becomes pretty obvious once one stops to think about it; you do have to think about it, though".
Michael Corner (Physiology Professor) Amsterdam, 2005 A.D.

"The most surprising thing about these conclusions is that they should be found to be surprising"
Philip Corner (Music Professor) Piscataway, 2006 A.D.

Introduction. After what felt like an eternity during which it was "just not done" to bring up the subject of consciousness in scientific circles (at least if you wished to preserve your reputation as a serious investigator), the pendulum suddenly swung rapidly in the opposite direction towards the end of the previous century. I would be less than honest, however, if I failed to admit that my initial enthusiasm about a development I had eagerly looked forward to has proven to be largely disappointing, owing to the fragmented (and sometimes downright fallacious) analyses which too many of the thinkers rushing to tackle this question have put on display. Driven nevertheless by a compelling personal need to see the relevant facts and the most useful concepts organized into a coherent schematic overview, I've attempted to fill the void by making a rigorously organized compilation of those tentative conclusions which can be regarded as being present best guesses concerning the 'mind/brain problem'. The overlapping questions of biological determinism vs. freedom of will, on the one hand, and the neurological basis for consciousness and the experience of self, on the other hand, are sufficiently distinct that it was expedient to divide the present essay into two parts. I believe that the respective lines of argument in each section thereby become cleared of distracting considerations which are not directly pertinent to the main point being made. [In a certain sense, part II can also be regarded as a sort of footnote to the allusions to brain physiology made in part I]

With the recognition that the doctrine of 'free-will' is an essentially negative assertion ­ to wit: "voluntary actions are neither caused by strictly biological mechanisms nor deducible from deterministic laws of nature" - comes the realization that arguments purporting to support this conclusion only serve to inhibit further research on the subject. If hypotheses to the contrary can already be convincingly demonstrated to be highly implausible, why take the trouble (and the risk) to check them out anyway? I felt it incumbent on me, therefore, to critically examine lines of thought that would tend to have such a stultifying effect on neuro-psychological investigations into the deepest and most intractable aspects of the human mind and its relationship to the natural world. For this task, it has turned out to be quite unnecessary to engage in complicated logical exercises, since the a priori case against the biological determination of human wilfulness turns out upon closer examination to be a transparent mixture of cultural bias and wishful thinking rather than of sound argumentation. I suspect that anyone permitting him/herself to ask "honestly, how compelling would I find this line of reasoning were I not so desirous of believing its conclusion?" will eventually come to the same conclusion. Part I of this essay, then, essentially serves the function of an "Emperor's New Clothes" - back to fundamentals - for an open-minded, philosophically inclined audience.

The second part of this dual essay begins in a similar vein by pointing out that it is only a restricted portion of our conscious experience, viz., the sense of Self, that leads us to doubt that consciousness could be purely an "inner aspect" of higher brain function, playing no para-neuronal role in determining our thoughts and actions. Since the subjective duality between ourselves and an apparent outside world is the central phenomenon linking the two parts of this essay, most of the discussion in the second section is devoted to characterizing self-consciousness as we ordinarily experience it, supplemented by a brief discussion of 'altered states' and an initial neurophysiologic working hypothesis concerning their origin. Although seemingly simplistic at first sight, a straight-forward line of reasoning suggests that the proposed 'model for the varieties of conscious experience' should nevertheless be useful at least as a first approximation. It being the fruit of quite a few years spent mulling over and refining the main ideas 'in my free(!) time', I've resisted any temptation to try to develop the model still further or to speculate about its putative implications until some empirical validation becomes available. Part II, then, can also be construed as a plea for pilot experiments along the indicated lines.

[The book references scattered throughout the text are intended to serve as a sort of 'Mind/Brain Canon', pinpointing seminal pioneering works which together provide a readily accessible intellectual foundation and historical perspective for the various points raised.]

Prologue. 'Intelligent Design' (ID) is a concept that currently dominates the question of social acceptance and teaching of the theory of evolution. Actually, the attack is directed primarily against the Darwinian mechanism of 'natural selection', using fallacious arguments about the practical impossibility of living cells to organize themselves into complex forms . In reality, however, the original proponents of evolution were mostly believing Christians who recognized a variety of means by which a 'divine designer' could have created a dynamic rather than a static biotope. There is no compelling religious objection, namely, to a creator who is perpetually at work replacing old forms by new ones, or even steering gradual changes from one to another. The current misleading conflation of ID to a refutation of all possible evolutionary scenarios, in favor of a Biblical creationist story, thus goes far beyond what the concept of ID inherently implies.